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In 1997, Fiji’s Constitution Review
Commission (CRC) produced a voluminous
proposal for constitutional reform, The Fiji
Islands: Towards a United Future, which
recommended that Fiji move ‘gradually but
decisively’ away from communalism
towards a free, open and multi-ethnic
political system. Acknowledging that
political parties in many ethnically-divided
societies tend to be based around particular
ethnic groups, the Commission’s stated
objective was ‘to find ways of encouraging
all, or a sufficient number, of them to come
together for the purpose of governing the
country in a way that gives all communities
an opportunity to take part’ (Constitution
Review Commission 1996:308). They viewed
the electoral system as the most powerful tool
by which the nature of Fijian politics could
be influenced and engineered. After
assessing and evaluating most major
electoral systems against criteria such as the
capacity to encourage multi-ethnic
government; recognition of the importance
of political parties; incentives for moderation
and co-operation across ethnic lines; and
effective representation of constituents, they
recommended the adoption of a preferential
alternative vote (AV) electoral system for all
future elections in Fiji (Constitution Review
Commission 1996:304).
AV is a type of majority electoral system,
which requires electors to rank candidates
in the order of their choice, by marking a ‘1’
for their favoured candidate, ‘2’ for their
second choice, ‘3’ for their third choice, and
so on. The system thus enables voters to
express their preferences between
candidates, rather than simply their first
choice. Any candidate with an absolute
majority (that is, more than 50 per cent) of
first preferences is immediately declared
elected. However, if no candidate has an
absolute majority of first-preferences, the
candidate with the lowest number of first
preference votes is eliminated and his or her
ballot papers redistributed to remaining
candidates according to the lower-order
preferences marked. This process of
sequential elimination and transfer of votes
continues until a majority winner emerges.
The CRC argued that politicians and
political parties were the key actors in the
political system, and would respond
rationally to incentives or restraints imposed
by the electoral system. Under an AV system,
as long as constituencies were ethnically
heterogeneous and there was a number of
political parties contesting the elections,
politicians and parties would need to attract
the second or third preference votes of voters
from another ethnic group to maximise their
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chances of electoral success. Candidates who
adopted moderate positions on ethnic issues
and attempted to represent the ‘middle
ground’ would, under this logic, be more
successful than extremists. By making
politicians from one group reliant on votes
from the other group for their electoral
success, AV could, the Commissioners
argued, encourage a degree of ‘preference
swapping’ between groups which could help
to encourage accommodation between (and
within) Fiji’s divided Indian and indigenous
Fijian communities. These incentives for
election would thus work to move Fijian
politics away from the extremes towards a
more moderate, centrist, multi-racial
competition for power.
Fiji’s 1999 elections
How did this unusual constitutional
architecture work in practice? Fiji’s 1999
parliamentary election, the first held under
the new dispensation, provided an
opportunity to put the new system to a
practical test. Early signs were encouraging
for the advocates of constitutional reform.
Apparently in reaction to the new incentives
for cross-communal vote-pooling and
cooperation in the reformed electoral system,
even before campaigning began parts of Fiji’s
previously settled party system began to
change. In a move that would have been
unthinkable just a few years earlier, political
parties from both sides of the ethnic divide
came together to make early pre-election
alliances, with the result that the election was
effectively fought between two large multi-
ethnic coalitions rather than the
predominantly mono-ethnic parties of
previous years. Parties representing the three
official ethnic groups—indigenous Fijians,
Indo-Fijians and ‘General’ electors—formed
the core of both coalitions. The former, under
the leadership of the 1987 coup-master,
Sitiveni Rabuka, was built around the
governing Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
(SVT), the National Federation Party (NFP),
and the United General Party (UGP). Each of
these parties had a clear ethnic base: the SVT
with indigenous Fijians, the NFP with Indo-
Fijians, and the UGP with general electors.
The alternative coalition group was headed
by the multi-ethnic but Indian-backed Fiji
Labour Party (FLP)—whose election to
government in 1987 had been the catalyst
for the coup—but also included hard-line
Fijian parties such as the Party of National
Unity (PANU) and the Fijian Association
Party (FAP). Known as the ‘People’s
Coalition’, this alliance was headed by the
Indo-Fijian leader of the FLP, former trade
union boss Mahendra Chaudhry. The parties
in this alliance formed only a loose coalition,
and stood multiple candidates in several
seats, while the SVT-led group formed a more
conventional binding pre-election coalition,
designating an agreed first-choice candidate
in each constituency. But the trend was clear:
for the first time in Fiji’s history, cross-ethnic
politics began to emerge. Coalition
possibilities created new bargaining arenas
and brought together former adversaries
from across the ethnic divide, encouraging
‘understanding and cross-cultural friendship
among candidates facing each other in the
election’ (Lal 1999:6).
The election campaign was the first in
Fiji’s history not to be dominated by the
issues of race. The campaign, according to
Lal, was
…the most relaxed in living
memory. Trading preferences with
other parties dampened what
would have been a fiery campaign.
For once, race was relegated to the
background because both
coalitions were multiracial (Lal
1999:5).
However, many of the preference swapping
arrangements struck between parties were
motivated primarily by political expediency
and rational calculations, rather than on the
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basis of shared visions or aligned interests.
In 22 seats, for example, the FLP directed its
preferences to the traditionalist and ultra-
nationalist Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo
(VLV), a party whose interests ran counter to
that of most Indo-Fijians. The main
alternative to the FLP for most Indo-Fijians,
the NFP, placed the VLV last on their
preference orderings as a matter of ‘principle
and morality’. In the end, however, the FLP
chose expediency.
For Labour … the election was not
about principle and morality: it
was about winning. To that end, it
put those parties last which posed
the greatest threat. Among these
parties was the NFP, its main rival
in the Indian communal seats.
Labour’s unorthodox tactic
breached the spirit and intention of
the preferential system of voting,
where like-minded parties trade
preferences among themselves and
put those they disagree most with
last. Political expediency and cold-
blooded ruthlessness triumphed
(Lal 1999:20).
At the election, preferences were
distributed in 50.7 per cent of the country’s
71 constituencies—a high level by
comparison with Australian and Papua New
Guinean examples—although all contests in
the Indian and Rotuman communal seats
were won outright. Moreover, in five of the
open seats and nine of the Fijian communal
seats, the leader on first preferences lost as a
result of preference distribution. One effect
of this was to channel votes not so much
across the ethnic divide, but from more
extreme to more moderate ethnic parties. The
militant Fijian Nationalist Party, for example,
distributed most of its lower order
preferences towards more moderate Fijian
parties such as SVT, despite the latter’s
coalition arrangement with the NFP. In
general, however, the fragmentation of the
Fijian vote was a major cause of the
unprecedented—and largely unexpected—
landslide victory for the People’s Coalition.
The mainstay of the Coalition, the Indo-Fijian
backed FLP, gained a majority in its own right,
enabling Mahendra Chaudhry to thus
become Fiji’s first ever Indo-Fijian prime
minister. The FLP was the only party to gain
a good spread of votes in both rural and
urban seats, and in both open and communal
constituencies, although it was a poor
performer in the Fijian communal seats. It
fielded several indigenous Fijian candidates
and ran largely on a multi-ethnic, class-
based platform. Nonetheless, the People’s
Coalition was viewed by many indigenous
Fijians as Indo-Fijian dominated, despite the
new cabinet comprising representatives of
the three People’s Coalition partners and the
VLV. In total, eight parties and three
independents gained seats in parliament.
The former governing party, the SVT, which
could have taken up its mandated seats in
cabinet under the Constitution’s ‘grand
coalition’ provisions, elected to move to the
opposition benches. While the SVT lost
heavily—winning just 8 seats—its Indo-
Fijian ally, the NFP, did even worse, not
winning a single seat. The new government
thus entered office with a massive and
unforseen parliamentary majority, while the
opposition parties were reduced to a small
rump group.
A transfer of power across not only party
but also ethnic lines was a new experience
for Fiji, and constituted a major test of the
new institutional arrangements and of the
country’s political maturity. But it was not to
last. Popular discontent on the part of many
indigenous Fijians at the presence of an Indo-
Fijian Prime Minister continued to simmer,
and Prime Minister Chaudhry’s sometimes
outspoken advocacy of Indo-Fijian rights
served to deepen mistrust over key issues
such as land ownership. In May 2000, in an
eerie echo of the 1987 coups and exactly one
year after the 1999 election, a group of
gunmen headed by a failed part-Fijian
businessman, George Speight, burst into the
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parliament building and took the new
government hostage, claiming a need to
restore Fijian paramountcy to the political
system. Utilising weapons apparently stolen
from army depots, Speight and his
supporters—some of them members of the
Fijian army’s Special Forces Unit—amassed
an extraordinary armory of firepower which
enabled them not only to overthrow the
elected government violently, but also to
engineer the collapse of most of the state
institutions that were central to Fiji’s return
to constitutional rule—including not just the
parliament and the prime ministership but
also the presidency and even key indigenous
bodies such as the Great Council of Chiefs.
Apparently robust institutions and forums
fell apart at the first push. By the time the
hostages were released and Speight and his
supporters arrested, Fiji had returned to
military rule, with the military-appointed
Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, announcing
yet another review of the constitution, with a
new election scheduled for August 2001.
The effects of the electoral system
To most observers, the May 2000 coup in Fiji
marked another, and possibly decisive, nail
in the coffin for hopes of a multi-ethnic and
democratic future for the country. As in 1987,
the election of an Indo-Fijian led government,
combined with the waning influence of some
traditional powerholders within indigenous
ranks, provided fertile ground for extremist
elements within the Fijian community to
arouse popular discord and fear. The
elaborate constitutional and electoral
provisions recommended by the CRC—
which had been partly implemented at Fiji’s
1999 elections and had appeared to
encourage the first tentative steps towards
genuine multi-ethnic politics—were no
match for balaclava-clad men carrying
machine guns. History, it appeared, was
repeating itself.
The familiar circumstances of the May
2000 coup, and the apparently recurring
phenomenon in Fiji of extra-constitutional
attacks upon democratic institutions which
deliver the ‘wrong’ result in ethnic terms,
suggests that the latest breakdown of
democracy in Fiji was not just a failure of
constitutional engineering but a broader
failure of political leadership, capacity and
commitment within Fiji to the idea of a multi-
ethnic democracy. Nonetheless, some
observers did see a link between the 1997
constitutional reforms and the 2000 coup—
and specifically, the apparently deleterious
effects of the use of an alternative vote (AV)
preferential electoral system for Fiji’s 1999
elections. In a newspaper article published
at the height of the hostage crisis, Jon
Fraenkel claimed that
Speight’s attempted takeover has
received considerable support
amongst indigenous Fijians because
many felt politically marginalised
under Chaudhry’s People’s
Coalition government. An important
part of the reason for this was the
way Fiji’s Australian-style electoral
system operated at the elections in
May last year (Fraenkel 2000).
Fraenkel argued that the electoral system
‘manufactured’ an overly-large majority for
the People’s Coalition, and particularly for
its largest party, the Fiji Labour Party. This
meant that Labour was able to ignore the
needs of its indigenous Fijian allies—and
thus, according to Fraenkel, making resort to
extra-parliamentary action more likely. In
addition, the preferential voting system ‘gave
the Fiji Labour Party key indigenous Fijian
votes that it would not otherwise have been
able to obtain…the transfer of these
preference votes were, in most cases, not a
genuine expression of voters’ choices’.
Overall the electoral system, he argued,
‘proved extraordinarily complex, the results
remarkably ambiguous and its merits as a
tool for promoting ethnic co-operation highly
questionable’ (Fraenkel 2000).
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While Fraenkel’s arguments were overly-
deterministic and contested by a number of
other observers (see Letters to the Editor,
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 2000), he did
raise some important issues that highlighted
the weakness of Fiji’s 1999 electoral reforms.
In particular, three apparently minor changes
made to the electoral system shortly prior to
the poll had a significant impact on the
election result, and on some of the broader
phenomena that observers like Fraenkel
believed encouraged Speight’s coup. First, in
imitation of Australian practice, both
registration and voting were made
compulsory for the 1999 election, meaning
that those who failed to vote could in theory
be fined—which presumably was something
of a spur for Fiji’s very high turnout of 90.2
per cent. This provision, which was not part
of the CRC’s own recommendations,
appeared to have a clear partisan impact: the
victorious Fiji Labour Party, for example,
managed to more than double its 1994 vote.
Second, and consistent with mandatory
voting, the expression of preferences on the
ballot paper was also made compulsory,
meaning that voters had to number at least
three-quarters of all names on their ballot or
have their vote declared invalid. Finally, and
probably as a result of the uncertain effects
of compulsory preference marking, a ‘ticket’
voting option, as per the Australian Senate,
was included on each ballot paper. This
allowed voters to forego the task of manually
ranking all candidates on the ballot. With
one tick voters could accept their favoured
party’s full ordering of preference
distribution amongst all candidates
standing, from a list which had previously
been lodged with the electoral authorities.
The ‘ticket vote’ option was exercised by
around 95 per cent of all voters, and had a
marked effect on the eventual election
outcome and on the capacity of the electoral
system to encourage inter-ethnic accommod-
ation. Because electors were encouraged to
accept a party’s pre-set preference ordering,
a major impact of ticket voting was that it
pushed decisions on preference marking out
of the hands of voters and towards party
élites. The type of cross-cultural communi-
cation which the preferential system was
supposed to engender became sharply
attenuated and focussed predominantly at
the level of party apparatchiks and
strategists, as it was ultimately the party
leadership, not voters, who effectively
determined where lower-order preference
votes would be directed. The introduction of
ticket voting thus served to remove a key
moderating device from the electoral
machinery, as individual candidates had
little incentive to interact with other parties
or to address wider groups of voters once
preference-swapping deals had been made
by party bosses. In particular, ticket voting
served to undermine the incentives for
preference-swapping at the candidate level,
as deals struck in advance at a national level
formed the basis of most vote transfer
arrangements. In effect, the ‘ticket vote’
option meant that electoral competition, for
the most part, largely took place between
rival ‘élite cartels’ and hence that the AV
system as a mechanism for genuine local
level inter-ethnic accommodation was found
wanting.
The deleterious impact of ticket voting
was exacerbated by the way electoral
districts were drawn, ensuring that
opportunities for genuine inter-ethnic
cooperation at the constituency level were
rare. Because only the 25 open electorates
enabled multi-ethnic competition, and of
these no more than eight were reasonably
balanced in their mixture of indigenous Fijian
and Indo-Fijian voters, the vast majority of
electorate-level contests provided no
opportunity at all for cross-ethnic campaigns,
appeals or outcomes. Some estimates suggest
that only six seats were genuinely
competitive between ethnic groups, as the
heterogeneous electoral districts required to
make cross-ethnic transfers an optimal
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strategy for electoral success did not in fact
exist in most cases (Roberts 1999). The CRC’s
recommendation for a ‘good’ proportion of
members of both major communities in all
open seats was interpreted extremely loosely,
to mean ethnic balances of up to 90:10 in
some cases, which obviated the need for intra-
communal vote swapping. In most seats,
clear Indian or Fijian majorities prevailed.
Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that
relatively little cross-ethnic vote-trading
actually occurred in most electorates. As one
report noted, ‘Fiji’s new electoral system
remains heavily skewed along racial lines,
even after the constitutional review. It took
nearly twice as many voters to elect a Member
of Parliament in an open [that is, multi-racial]
seat as in a communal seat…the electoral
system was heavily weighted against open
seats’ (Fraenkel 1999:44).
Nonetheless, largely as a result of the
inter-élite deals on the direction of preferences
from ticket voting, votes did transfer across
group lines in a surprisingly large number
of cases. Preferences were distributed in a
majority (36) of the 71 constituencies, and
resulted in a candidate who was not leading
on first preferences winning in 16 of these—
which, at 22 per cent of all seats, represents
the highest rate of preferences changing
outcomes of any AV election in any country
to date. In five of these cases, seats were won
on preferences by candidates from the
minority ethnic community in the
constituency—which suggests a significant
degree of cross-ethnic voting. The big losers
of the 1999 election, for example, the Indo-
Fijian NFP and the indigenous Fijian SVT,
lost most of their seats in communal
districts—defeat that cannot be attributed to
inter-ethnic accommodation or lack thereof,
although Fraenkel (2000) claims that ‘both
parties were defeated because of their
willingness to compromise with the other’.
By contrast, the Fiji Labour Party—a
consciously multi-racial party – gained more
seats from AV than it lost, and in fact it was
transfers from three largely Fijian-backed
parties that gave Labour its absolute majority.
However, much of this vote-transfer activity
came as a result of the sometimes bizarre
ticket voting agreements made by party
leaders. In some seats, for reasons best
known to the respective party leaders, a ticket
vote for one party actually counted as a first
preference vote for a candidate from another
party (Roberts 1999:6). In others—such as the
case of FLP directing their preferences away
from their main rival for Indian votes, the
NFP, and towards nationalist Fijian parties
like the VLV—the strategic considerations of
party leaders which led to such ‘deals with
the devil’ would clearly not have been
replicated by most ordinary voters. Most
Indo-Fijians who voted for the FLP would
probably have passed their preference vote
on to an allied party like the NFP if they did
not have the ticket vote option. In fact the
NFP, which won 14.8 per cent of the votes
but no parliamentary seats, appeared to be a
clear victim of the ticket voting system. This,
and the over-representation of the victorious
FLP, led to an extremely disproportional
electoral outcome, with more than double the
level of disproportionality of AV elections in
Australia.  The effect of this was not so much
of under-representing minorities as of wiping
out some of the majority parties. The SVT, for
example, obtained the largest share of the
ethnic Fijian vote, 38 per cent, but gained
only 8 parliamentary seats, while the NFP
did even worse, winning no seats at all
despite gaining 32 per cent of the Indo-Fijian
vote.
Such a level of disproportionality clearly
undermined prospects for an accommodative
outcome in Fiji. Combined with the bizarre
impacts of ticket voting, it points to some
serious deficiencies in the Fijian electoral
model which served to negate some of the
beneficial impacts of the CRC’s original
proposals. First, the drawbacks of the ticket
voting option in terms of moving the power
of decision-making away from ordinary
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voters and towards more calculating party
élites clearly undermined the intention of
vote-pooling. Analyses of the elections
featured numerous accounts of how ordinary
voters did not understand the direction in
which their preferences were heading under
the ticket vote arrangements.1 Overall, the
way in which ticket voting served to skew
the election results clearly outweighed any
benefits in terms of simplicity it may have
provided. In addition, the parliament’s
decision to adopt single-member electorates,
rather than the multi-member seats
recommended by the CRC, meant that it
proved almost impossible to draw electoral
constituencies that were ethnically
heterogeneous—a key facilitating condition
for vote-pooling. And, as most seats remained
communal contests anyway, the CRC’s
proposals were, in effect, never properly put
to the test.
Despite the drawbacks of the electoral
system as implemented, it is clear that the
introduction of preferential voting did play
a modest but important role in breaking old
habits of mono-ethnic politics in Fiji,
facilitating cross-ethnic bargaining, and
helping to build new routines of inter-ethnic
negotiation and cooperation. In particular,
the opportunities for inter-ethnic bargaining
that the new rules provided were both eagerly
exploited and adapted by élites from both
communities and, in combination with the
expectations of places at the power-sharing
cabinet table, served to significantly cool the
rhetoric of the campaign. Indeed, one of the
most striking aspects of the election was how,
in marked contrast to previous election
campaigns which concentrated on racial
issues, the 1999 campaign was strongly
focused on ‘bread and butter’ issues such as
the economy, rather than ethnic ones (Lal
1999). Whether this marked anything more
than a temporary aberration in Fiji’s
unfolding cycle of intermittent democratic
elections followed by anti-democratic coups
remains to be seen.
Recommendations for the future
If the Pandora’s Box of electoral reform is to
be opened again in the future in Fiji, as seems
inevitable, one clear conclusion is that, while
the multi-ethnic incentives of a preferential
ballot should be retained, a more
proportional system which enables the
drawing of larger and more ethnically-
heterogeneous electoral districts should be
considered. In particular, a system like the
Single Transferable Vote (STV), which
combines preference voting with
proportional representation and multi-
member electorates, deserves serious
consideration—as I and a number of other
observers prior to the 1999 election were in
fact suggesting (see Reilly 1997; Arms 1997).
The benefits of STV is that it delivers much
more proportional results than AV, while still
enabling the transfer of preferences between
parties that can help push Fiji in the direction
of multi-ethnic politics. The application of
STV in small (3 or 5 member) districts can
also serve to promote the interests of the
‘moderate middle’, as was the case in
Northern Ireland’s crucial 1998 ‘Good
Friday’ agreement elections, where voters on
both sides of the communal divide were able
to direct their lower-order preference votes
towards centrist, moderate and multi-ethnic
parties—a phenomenon that greatly
bolstered the ‘pro-peace’ forces (Reilly 2001).
Interestingly, an earlier commission of
inquiry into Fiji’s electoral system in 1975,
chaired by Professor Harry Street, came to a
similar conclusion. The Street Commission,
as it was known, recommended a series of
reforms, based on the same implicit thinking
as the CRC, to the electoral provisions of Fiji’s
1970 independence Constitution. It argued
that Fiji needed an electoral system ‘which
is fair and equitable, and which at the same
time does not encourage or perpetuate
communal thinking or communal politics’.
Its conclusion was that the Fijian parliament
should comprise a mixture of communal and
149
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 16 Number 1 May 2001 © Asia Pacific Press
open seats, with 25 members elected in open
competition from five multi-member
constituencies using STV, and 28 members
elected from communal rolls in single-
member constituencies using AV (Parliament
of Fiji 1975:12–16).
It is important that any future electoral
reforms in Fiji learn from such historical
recommendations, and from cases like
Northern Ireland. But there is no need to
throw out the baby with the bathwater. To
lurch back to a first-past-the-post system,
as some have suggested, would solve none
of the problems identified at the 1999
elections, and would almost certainly add
a number of new ones. As Fiji’s highest court
pointed out in March 2001, had the 1999
elections been held under a first-past-the-
post system, ‘the People’s Coalition would
still have won 45 seats, giving it a
comfortable majority’, and even under
proportional representation they would still
have won a clear election victory (Court of
Appeal, Fiji Islands 2001:12) Such evidence
undermines arguments that the 1999 result
was somehow the result of a faulty electoral
system. But Fiji’s electoral law does need
improving, and there is a clear case for
building a simpler and more proportional
form of preferential system. The best way to
achieve this is by a balanced assessment of
what elements of the new electoral system
worked as intended, and what did not. I
hope that this paper has set out some
signposts for the road ahead.
Notes
1 The following account is typical: ‘In hindsight,
many Fijian voters are wishing they had
familiarised themselves more with the
preferential system. More so when they
voted above the line. If I knew VLV gave
first preference to the Labour candidate in
my open constituency, I would have voted
for the SVT,’ says a VLV supporter ruefully.
There are many like him’ (see ‘How Fijians
dumped Rabuka’, The Review, June 1999:40).
References
Arms, D.G., 1997. ‘Fiji’s proposed new
voting system: a critique with counter-
proposals’, in B.V. Lal and P. Larmour
(eds), Electoral Systems in Divided
Societies, National Centre for
Development Studies, The Australian
National University, Canberra:97–134.
Constitution Review Commission, 1996.
The Fiji Islands: towards a united future,
Parliamentary paper No. 34 of 1996,
Parliament of Fiji, Suva.
Court of Appeal, Fiji Islands, 2001. Republic
of Fiji Islands and Attorney General v
Prasad: Judgement of the Court, Suva.
Fraenkel, J.M., 1999. ‘Why it happened the
way it did’, The Review, June.
——, 2000. ‘Fiddling with democracy fails’,
The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June.
Lal, B.V., 1999. A Time to Change: The Fiji
General Elections of 1999, Discussion
Paper 23, Department of Political and
Social Change, The Australian National
University,  Canberra.
Parliament of Fiji, 1975. Report of the Royal
Commission Appointed for the Purpose of
Considering and Making Recommendations
as to the Most Appropriate Method of
Electing Members to, and Representing the
People of Fiji in, the House of
Representatives, Parliamentary Paper
No. 24, Government Printer, Suva.
Reilly, B., 1997. ‘Constitutional engineering
and the alternative vote in Fiji’, in B.V.
Lal and P. Larmour (eds), Electoral
Systems in Divided Societies, National
Centre for Development Studies, The
Australian National University,
Canberra:73–96.
——, 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies:
electoral engineering for conflict
management, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Roberts, N., 1999. ‘Living Up To
Expectations? The New Fijian Electoral
System and the 1999 General Election’,
paper presented to Citizens
Constitutional Forum, Suva.
